Canada-China Relations Committee on April 19th, 2024

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Thank you very much.

We talked a little about the talent programs and scientists having affiliation with them, Ms. Jeffrey.

Would you have Canadians believe that these are the only two scientists with undeclared affiliation to talent programs with foreign governments?

[Heather Jeffrey]

I can't comment on what undeclared collaborations might be there. I can say that at the agency we have a policy requiring affiliations and conflict of interest to be declared. No such affiliations have been declared, and if they were declared, they would not be accepted.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Thank you very much.

We've heard previously of course that Ebola and Nipah were shipped on a flight. I believe it was Air Canada, but I might have the exact commercial carrier incorrect.

Is that a normal procedure? Unlike our friend from the NDP, of course we realize that it was not carried on board, but is that a usual procedure?

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin]

Yes, the transfer of level 4 pathogens falls under the transportation of dangerous goods regulations, which involves the development of an emergency research response action plan as well as a number of additional checks.

However, the ultimate carrier for these types of samples is often commercial.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Dr. Ellis.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Mr. Fragiskatos, you have five minutes.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Ms. Jeffrey, can you talk a little more about the screening processes in place with respect to researchers? How is that particularly different now, as a result of this experience?

[Heather Jeffrey]

I'd say that there are two levels of screening for all personnel who require clearances.

There is, of course, the security screening process, which we've already discussed here, including reliability status, including criminal and Canadian Security Intelligence Service checks.

There is also a separate Human Pathogens and Toxins Act clearance that's required to work with any sensitive listed materials. It also requires additional training in the use of those pathogens, as well as a separate security clearance that must be granted by the regulator.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Can we go back to the point on security screening? I understand that you've already shared with us information on that, but I am thinking about it especially in terms of the wider international context, which to me is fundamental in terms of learning from this experience.

Does the security screening process have some kind of harmonization, for lack of a better word, with what other countries are doing from a security screening perspective in their labs, or is it something that's quite unique to Canada? Is there some overlap, but not an entire overlap? Do you have any comments on that?

As we've heard at this committee before, this is not an issue that Canada is dealing with on its own. There are other countries, other allies, that have, if not the same experience, very similar experiences or challenges that they're preparing for, if they haven't already taken place. I just wonder about this from a wider international context.

[Heather Jeffrey]

I think obviously there are different legislative frameworks in different countries, but I think all countries would have in common a security screening and clearance process similar to the one that we have, writ large.

Countries also have specific legislation, but it differs for each country, similar to our Human Pathogens and Toxins Act. I'll turn to Dr. Poliquin, who has been dealing with labs in other countries, to speak to their different processes.

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin]

Indeed, President Jeffrey is correct that, conceptually, other laboratories in the level 4 space operate in the same way with respect to the need for additional security screening prior to having access to level 3 and level 4 pathogens, particularly security-sensitive ones.

However, the specific mechanics of how that is ascertained is done at the country level.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

I have only about two minutes left.

To both of you, what are the fundamental lessons learned here from an agency perspective? What has been learned, and what will you continue to be focused on to ensure the absolute security of the lab?

[Heather Jeffrey]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

We've implemented a whole series of security enhancements based on the lessons learned from this process. The different areas of security policy and procedure that I outlined earlier range from cybersecurity to physical security to security clearances and above all to employee awareness, education and compliance. These are all reflections of the lessons we've learned from these issues.

In addition, I would say that the much stronger collaboration with our Public Safety and Canadian Security Intelligence Service colleagues that began during and immediately before these incidents, and the awareness and outreach of the research community that triggered the agency to look into these cases and ultimately led to the termination of these scientists, were the initial program of that work. Our global environment and evolving threat picture is such that we have to be closely joined up throughout the research process and throughout our work.

The additional work we have undertaken with Public Safety and CSIS through the pandemic context and our emergency response protocols are much tighter and closer than before.

The policies and procedures we put in place from an employee and research perspective are designed to provide flags much earlier than would have been the case before these incidents occurred.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Fragiskatos.

It's back to you, Mr. Villemure, for two and a half minutes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

You told me a little earlier, Ms. Jeffrey, that no one had been held responsible for this situation. There was no internal discipline, blame, or anything like that.

[Heather Jeffrey]

I would say that the two employees who actually were in violation of the policies have been terminated. Those were the disciplinary actions that were taken.

Those were the only violations of policies and protocols that were at play in these administrative investigations. They have been accordingly fired.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, but those are obviously not the people I'm talking about.

I've been listening to your answers for almost two hours. You say that there were incidents, that it was no one's fault, that you put policies in place, that everything will be fine and that it wasn't that serious.

However, this whole affair turned the House of Commons upside down, led the government to sue the former Speaker of the House for certain things not to be revealed, and led to the creation of an ad hoc committee made up of umpires. However, when we listen to your answers, we would think that nothing serious had happened.

I'm surprised that these incidents are trivialized in this way, and I'm not reassured as to what measures are being taken or could be taken. If there was a consequence, meaning the firing of two scientists, it was because there was a reason. But you don't seem to be able to tell us what the reason is.

[Heather Jeffrey]

In my opening statement, I made it very clear that these were very serious security incidents. They were a violation of the duty of loyalty that all of our scientists strive to uphold every day. We take them very seriously indeed.

The protections that are in place to protect national security information and privacy information meant that they could not be fully disclosed in the public domain without appropriate protections, which have been provided by the ad hoc committee and the panel of arbiters. We're very pleased to be here today to discuss them.

I would say that foreign interference, as my Canadian security intelligence colleagues have said at this committee, is a very serious threat. It's a threat to our scientific research, public health capabilities and ability to respond to future threats. That's the reason we have put in place so many different measures across the different domains of security: personnel security, cybersecurity and physical security.

We take this very seriously. This duty of care is one that we are now maintaining and enhancing on an ongoing basis. This is not a static, one-time response. We have processes in place to periodically review all of our policies and procedures, to report incidents and to take actions to address them. I can assure you that we take these duties very seriously indeed.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Villemure.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Ms. Idlout, you have two and a half minutes.

[Lori Idlout, NDP, Nunavut, NU]

Qujannamiik, Iksivautaq.

I'll be asking my final questions of the deputy minister of health, Mr. Stephen Lucas.

I'll be asking questions similar to those I asked of the Public Health Agency.

How often does your department meet with CSIS or other relevant security agencies to improve the operational security of Canada's research facilities?

[Dr. Stephen Lucas]

In the first instance, the chief security officer who's with us, Nadine Huggins, supports both Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada through the work of her team. In that regard, as Madam Jeffrey has noted, there is increased engagement as we have reviewed and strengthened a range of policies pertaining to security in our laboratories and increased engagement with CSIS, Public Safety and other relevant organizations, including the Communications Security Establishment in regard to cybersecurity.