Canada-China Relations Committee on April 29th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 39 of the House of Commons Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship. Pursuant to the order of reference of May 16, 2022, the committee is meeting for its study of the Canada-People's Republic of China relations.

I would like you to pay special attention to the following.

We need to avoid audio feedback. I understand that we had another injury amongst our interpreters, so we need to be extra careful. Before we begin, I'd like to remind all members and other meeting participants in the room of the following important preventative measures.

To prevent disruptive and potentially harmful audio feedback incidents that can cause injuries, all in-person participants are reminded to keep their earpieces away from all microphones at all times. As indicated in the communiqué from the Speaker to all members on Monday, April 29—today—the following measures have been taken to prevent audio feedback incidents.

All earpieces have been replaced by a model that greatly reduces the probability of audio feedback. The new earpieces are black in colour, whereas the former earpieces were gray. Please use only the black approved earpiece. By default, all unused earpieces will be unplugged at the start of the meeting.

When you're not using your earpiece, please place it face down on the middle of the sticker, which you'll find on the table for this purpose, as indicated. Please consult the cards on the table for guidance to prevent audio feedback incidents.

The room layout has been adjusted to increase the distance between microphones and reduce the chance of feedback from ambient earpieces.

These measures are in place so that we can conduct our business without interruption and to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters.

I'd like to thank all of you for your co-operation.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your microphone, and please mute yourself when you're not speaking.

For interpretation for those on Zoom, you have the choice at the bottom of your screen of either the floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel. As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.

For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can, and we appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.

Per the motion adopted on March 26, 2024, we are hearing testimony in relation to the matters revealed in the Winnipeg lab documents.

We have some substitutions today: Mr. Naqvi is in for MP Oliphant, Mr. Angus for MP McPherson, Mr. Cooper for MP Lantsman and MP Ellis for Mr. Kurek.

Mr. Kurek will be a new permanent member of this committee, I understand.

Now I'd like to welcome our witnesses for our first panel.

Nathalie G. Drouin is the deputy clerk of the Privy Council Office and national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister, and she is accompanied by David Vigneault, director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Ms. Drouin, you have up to five minutes to deliver your opening remarks. We thank you for your patience while we got the voting business out of the way.

[Nathalie Drouin, Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council & National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, Privy Council Office]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you as well to the members of the committee for the opportunity to speak to you and answer some of your questions about the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg. With me this evening is David Vigneault, who is well known to the committee. He is the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS.

I was appointed deputy clerk of the Privy Council and national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister on January 27. In my role, I coordinate the national security and intelligence organizations that perform critical analyses.

In August 2018, CSIS provided a briefing to officials of the national lab to help them better understand potential foreign interference or espionage, including how employees could be vulnerable to outside pressure.

Soon after, PHAC identified two employees at the national lab who might be at risk and flagged their concerns to CSIS. PHAC subsequently noticed certain irregularities in the two scientists' activities, which prompted PHAC to initiate an investigation that, in turn, uncovered additional reasons for concern.

As the two scientists' conduct became clearer through the investigation, PHAC took action, including seeking assistance from CSIS and referring matters to the RCMP for criminal investigation. Both employees were placed on leave and ultimately had their security clearances revoked, and in January 2021 their employment was terminated.

Important lessons were learned from this matter and security policies were improved accordingly. However, I think it is important to remember that PHAC was successful at detecting and removing a threat following awareness and vigilance and by executing a robust, thorough process supported by security partners.

Canada's National Microbiology Laboratory is world-renowned for its research excellence and the many contributions of its public health researchers.

The lab is a prime example of a rich culture of open and collaborative scientific research that Canada can be extremely proud of. It is precisely due to this reputation that, for some time now, Canada's security agencies have been warning about threats to Canada's scientific community.

The reasons for this are easy to understand. Innovation drives economic prosperity and technological advantage. Competition among states is focusing attention on the edges of science. New discoveries can be immensely beneficial or, unfortunately, can be used to do harm.

Canada produces world-class research in critical areas such as artificial intelligence, robotics, aerospace, quantum technology and the life sciences. Our innovations make us a target. The People's Republic of China is the most significant research security threat actor in Canada, given its targeting of academia, government and private sector institutions.

Just as with PRC's political interference and transnational repression activities, China uses a wide variety of methods to pursue advanced technologies.

As this committee is aware, China is not the only country of concern. For example, we saw strong indication that Russian hackers tried to steal COVID-19 vaccine research during the pandemic.

As has been mentioned by other witnesses, the Public Health Agency of Canada has learned many lessons from the situation at the national lab in Winnipeg, and security at the lab has been improved. As you know, I was also tasked by the Prime Minister to make recommendations related to the situation.

I've already started my review. In particular, I visited the laboratory on April 25. While there, I took the opportunity to ask questions of the researchers on site and learn directly from them. We discussed the sensitive nature of the work done at the lab and how security measures have been improved.

My goal is to identify the ways we can continue to strengthen our research security, but I will also be mindful of the need to avoid discouraging innovation or collaboration with onerous security requirements.

One thing is certain: Engagement between research organizations and security is critical for raising awareness and building resilience. For example, the new research security centre at Public Safety Canada is providing advice to institutions across the country on how to protect their research while pursuing their work responsibly in the modern geopolitical environment.

Canada's national security agencies are committed to protecting Canadian research.

We would now be pleased to answer any questions the committee may have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Madame Drouin. I appreciate that.

Mr. Chong, the first six minutes is yours.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Madame Drouin, for appearing in front of us today. My first questions are for you.

You mentioned that the first flag went up in August 2018. It took until January 20, 2021 to terminate Dr. Qiu and Dr. Cheng from the employment of the Government of Canada.

What we're trying to understand here at the committee is the process that took two and a half years to result in that termination.

My first question is, when did the Privy Council Office first learn of the concerns regarding Dr. Qiu and Dr. Cheng?

[Nathalie Drouin]

I don't have specific dates to offer to you. As you know, I was not at the Privy Council, but this is not the reason. I know that my predecessor briefed the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's Office regarding the situation at the lab.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

You can provide that information later to the chair of the committee.

Could you provide us with roughly the month and year that this information was brought to the PCO's attention?

[Nathalie Drouin]

I would be able to provide a timing in which that...but I believe it was not in 2018.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, because that would help us in writing our report with recommendations.

My next question is for Mr. Vigneault, also regarding timing.

The first flag goes up in August 2018. The lab is not secured until 10 months later on July 5, 2019. Do you think that is an appropriate length of time to secure a government facility in the context of what happened, or do you think that in the future those timelines should be tightened?

[David Vigneault, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Mr. Chong, if I remember, I think I testified that the initial concerns that were raised were more in the nature of administrative issues, as opposed to national security issues. I think that explains, in part, some of these delays.

One thing that's clear, however, is that since 2018, as Ms. Drouin just mentioned, the system has learned quite a bit more. We, as an intelligence service, are much more proactive. We're sharing more information in private and in public about these issues. All of us have been raising our game, so I would not expect that it would be necessarily the same timeline today. I think people's awareness of the threat to their research would be much different today than before.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I worked in the private sector before I came to public office, and I had to engage in workforce reductions during my time. They weren't always easy things to do, but never did it take two and a half years to terminate somebody for cause. In this situation, from start to finish, the process took almost two and a half years.

Do you think that this is an appropriate length of time? Have things changed within the Government of Canada so that when a situation like this comes up in the future, it won't take two and a half years to terminate somebody for unreliability and for losing their security clearance status?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I can speak to this question from a CSIS point of view in terms of our engagement.

As I mentioned in my previous testimony—a colleague of Mr. Chong was talking about the pace at which CSIS was able to produce this intelligence to the PHAC—I think this was done in a very effective manner in terms of time. In terms of the specific administrative decisions, I would refer the member to the PHAC for its own assessment of how it's been managing the issue. I think it's fair to say with regard to the spirit of your question, Mr. Chong, that things have changed inside the government, as well as within the PHAC specifically, as our colleagues have testified. I would imagine that today things would be much faster.

[Nathalie Drouin]

I'd like to add a couple of things.

First of all, it's always easy to look at what happened in the past with a retrospective lens and then see how easy it was. That is my first caveat.

However, I agree with you that from the first signal.... To the credit of CSIS and the PHAC, they were the ones who identified the first signal. However, from the first signal to the moment when the two scientists were put on leave, yes, there is a timeline that needs to be looked at. However, it's not like things were not done. A fact-finding exercise was done—

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

We recently had a globally and systemically important bank whose number-two executive was terminated after an investigation that lasted less than four weeks. This bank is a systemically, financially important bank, and this wasn't a junior employee.

What I'm saying to you is that in my private sector experience of having to do these difficult kinds of things, it never took this length of time.

That's one of the concerns that many of us on this committee have: that it took almost two and a half years from the first flag going up to a decision to terminate. That seems to be an awfully long period of time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Mr. Chong, thank you for your time.

We'll now go to Mr. Naqvi for six minutes.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Chair.

I want to welcome the CSIS director back to this committee. I'm not sure how many times we're going to ask him to keep coming back. I think this is at least the third time.

Thank you for your patience. I know you're a very busy person.

I also want to welcome Madame Drouin and congratulate her on her new assignment as the security adviser at the Privy Council Office.

Thank you. I've always enjoyed working with you.

Madame Drouin, I'm going to start with you and ask this question: In your experience thus far—and I know you've been with PCO for some time—what role, if any, does the Privy Council Office play in protecting Canada's research and intelligence?

[Nathalie Drouin]

Do you mean the role I'm playing?

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

I mean you and the Privy Council Office.

[Nathalie Drouin]

I think my role encompasses all national security aspects. We know now that national security also has an economic component. It can also have a health component and a climate component.

All of that is to say that our innovation and research and the safety of our researchers are under my purview, of course with the support of key departments, mainly the science departments and the national security agencies.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Research and protecting Canada's research are active parts of your portfolio from a security intelligence perspective.

[Nathalie Drouin]

I think what I'm saying is that researchers' innovation, as I said in my opening remarks, can be the targets and victims of national security threats. I need to make sure that the system we have in place, whether we're talking about the legislative framework or the procedures, is something that's being looked at by the different key departments and agencies.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Okay. That's fair.

To what extent does the Government of Canada monitor patent filings by public servants? Is this something that is typically investigated during the process of security screening?

[Nathalie Drouin]

There are a lot of layers to that.

If I talk only about labs, for example, employees are subject to security clearance at the secret level. They also have to respect the legislation that guides laboratories. If they need a top secret...they will have to respect another layer of protection.

There are a lot of layers in terms of what they need to protect.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Okay.

In your opening remarks, you talked about how the Public Health Agency of Canada acted in a fairly expedited manner when it learned about these two scientists and it took steps in order to ensure that the national microbiology lab and the work being done there were protected.

However, you also said there were important lessons learned. Can you articulate to us, in your view, what those important lessons were and what steps, in your opinion, the Privy Council Office and other government agencies are taking or have taken to implement those important lessons that you referred to?

[Nathalie Drouin]

I can talk about that.

First of all, let me repeat that when PHAC and the lab in particular received an awareness briefing from CSIS, they themselves identified employees who were at risk. They flagged those employees and found, unfortunately, other concerns. Those are things they have done.

In terms of the lessons learned, I think it was in a couple of areas where they thought that some improvements were required. First of all was on the management of their technology and making sure that, for example, they can trace who is accessing what and when, especially on the administrative documents—not necessarily the research documents, but things like, for example, patterns and things like that. They have strengthened their technology system to be able to trace who has access to what and when.

They also have enhanced their security and facility access to make sure, for example, that visitors cannot move within the lab without surveillance and without being escorted.

They have done a lot of employee communication and engagement. This is a very important component because in order to prevent other situations like that, awareness is key. Employees can be vulnerable and sometimes they don't realize that they are entering into a co-optee relationship, so awareness is very important.

Maybe as a parenthesis regarding that, I think that what the lab went through and the exercise that you're doing right now is completely unfortunate, but at the same time, it helps other scientists to realize that these things are real and that they need to care about security.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Ms. Drouin.

We'll now go to Mr. Bergeron for six minutes.