Foreign Affairs Committee on April 29th, 2024

[Dave Epp, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Leamington, ON]

Speaking of Mali, my understanding is that we were asked to leave by the Government of Mali. Is it a matter of us not fulfilling our obligations there? Is that why we were asked to leave?

[Dr. Walter Dorn]

No. In Mali, it was purely that there was a coup—actually two coups—and the leaders didn't want the UN there, so the MINUSMA mission left.

I'm talking about 2017, when we could have gotten the position.

[Dave Epp, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Leamington, ON]

We have a number of strategic assets in Mali. What can Canada do now?

[Dr. Walter Dorn]

It's so difficult. The Iamgold Corporation has large mines there. We have interests in and a long history of supporting Mali.

Mali was such an example of democracy for so many decades. It was what African countries could look up to. Now that the Wagner Group has a solidified presence, we have to work with allies to push back against the Wagner Group. The fight against Russia isn't just in Ukraine. It's in Africa too.

[Dave Epp, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Leamington, ON]

You're saying we've lost—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I'm afraid you're out of time, Mr. Epp.

We next go to Mr. Oliphant.

You have three minutes.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to all the witnesses.

We're not the defence committee, but I am interested in the peacekeeping issue.

I'm glad you mentioned the Canadian Forces College. That reminds me that perhaps peacekeeping is different in 2024 in Africa than it would have been in the 1990s. We go when we're asked. We don't engage and we don't attempt to bring sense to Africans, because they have their own sense. I'm quoting you on that.

I just want to be very clear about your understanding of what the needs are in the spectrum of peacebuilding, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and what Canada's role could be. If Africa has provided soldiers, what can Canada provide that may be different, as an added value, from in the 1990s, when we put boots on the ground in a very different world?

[Dr. Walter Dorn]

The African missions today need peace enforcement in many cases, as in South Sudan, in DRC and in the Central African Republic. That requires combat-capable troops. Peace enforcement is only done when all other means have failed. As a last resort you use peacekeepers to do combat.

In many of these countries, it's absolutely necessary. The locals are pleading for peacekeepers to do something. They see them in their armoured personnel carriers moving around but not taking on the gangs. It's very important that the UN be more robust and provide a robust capability.

Canada can provide training. Some African peacekeeping training centres are using a simulation that I developed, a video game. You don't play a war fighter; you play a peacekeeper. The UN is considering adopting that.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I want to ask Professor Arduino a question with respect to China.

It's hard to get foreign direct investment numbers. It's apples and oranges in how you bring those together. However, European investments still vastly outweigh Chinese investments in the continent. We see a difference in the nature of western investment and China's investment, in the way we invest and how we invest.

Can you talk about what Canada's role could be in helping countries choose the best investments?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

If you can, answer in less than 30 seconds, please.

[Dr. Alessandro Arduino]

That's a great question.

If we look at the numbers, Chinese investment in Africa less than 20 years ago was less than $70 million U.S. In 2021, it amounted to more than $5 billion U.S. We see that China, as my colleague Professor Gazibo mentioned correctly earlier, is looking at economic development as the tip of the spear of its foreign policy in Africa. It resonated extremely well—

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I believe that in 2021, they went to $5 billion, but they dropped to $2 billion in 2022. I don't want to have a high-water mark. That's the only thing.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I'm afraid you're out of time, Mr. Oliphant.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you.

[Dr. Alessandro Arduino]

One last thing is that, essentially, it resonated well with the global south and multilateral development, especially with BRICS, which we are seeing now in Africa.

The issue is that the economic side needs security. This is something China is not able to provide as we speak, and we can see the difference with the Russian approach.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We will now go to Mr. Bergeron.

You have a minute and a half.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

This comment on the different approaches taken by Russia and China is quite intriguing.

Mr. Gazibo, I would like to discuss another topic of importance to you, which is the francophonie.

Africa is likely the next economic El Dorado. Africa is also the reason that French will be one of the languages—if not the language—with the greatest growth over the next 50 years. Does Canada know this, and is it taking the necessary steps to take these factors into account?

[Mamoudou Gazibo]

I agree with you.

Some countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are the reservoirs of current and future French speakers. Does Canada know this? I believe so. However, Canada too often lets France take the lead. I saw this a long time ago when I took part in a number of francophonie meetings, including the meetings on preparing the Bamako declaration.

There seems to be some backlash. These days, clearly France is facing serious challenges in its area, for a number of reasons. These reasons include colonialism and neo‑colonialism, currency and foreign intervention. As I said earlier, the context has changed, but not the practices.

If Canada doesn't take on a more leading role through Quebec, by better aligning the objectives of the francophonie with the vision shared by the African countries, French may be seen mainly through the lens of France. That said, I have nothing against France. I'm simply pointing out that, right now, any policy that goes through France is more—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Professor Gazibo, I'm afraid we're a minute over. We'll have to go to the next question.

MP McPherson, you have the last minute and a half.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you very much.

Professor Dorn, I'm going to ask one more question of you.

There were some comments made about whether or not peacekeeping today in 2024 is fit for purpose. I'm looking through the document “A New Agenda for Peace”, which came out of the United Nations last summer, about a year ago. It says, “To keep peacekeeping fit for purpose, a serious and broad-based reflection on its future is required, with a view to moving towards nimble adaptable models with appropriate, forward-looking transition and exit strategies.”

What's the best way we can ensure that Canada is engaged in that conversation? Where are the tools we need from here?

[Dr. Walter Dorn]

The best way to help the evolution of peacekeeping is by participating in it and getting the expertise we once had. One of our military advisers in New York at the Canadian permanent mission said, after I arrived at the Canadian Forces College, that we were the best peacekeepers in the world. I believed it then. We can be once again, but we have not been playing the game.

We don't know how to work within the UN system to get the best positions so that we can have the most effect in the UN. We contributed to every single peacekeeping operation for 50 years, from 1950 to 1996. That was an example of where we were present and really knew the system, but we've lost that capability.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you very much. That's a great way to end.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

That concludes our first panel.

Mr. Arduino, again, thank you for joining us from Italy at a very late time in the evening.

Professor Dorn, thank you for being with us and sharing your insights and expertise.

Professor Gazibo, thank you immeasurably for having been with us. As soon as this report is prepared, we will make sure to send you a copy.

We will now suspend for three minutes for the next panel.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

We'll resume our meeting.

Welcome back, everyone. We now have a new panel of witnesses.

We're grateful to have with us today, from Queen's University, Professor Andrew Grant. From Climate Refugees, we have Ms. Amali Tower, who is the founder and executive director. Last but certainly not least, from Partenariat international, we have Mr. Jean-Louis Roy, who is the president.

Each of you will be provided five minutes for your opening remarks, after which we will follow up with questions from members. I would just ask that you look over when I put up my cellphone. That means you have to wrap up within 10 seconds or so. We would be grateful if you pay attention to that so we don't fall behind.

All of that having been explained, we will start off with Professor Grant.

The floor is yours. You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[J. Andrew Grant, Associate Professor of Political Studies, Queen’s University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair and committee members.

My remarks are based on the field work visits I've conducted across Africa for more than 20 years, which have included interviews with government officials, mining company personnel, civil society organizations, and small-scale artisanal miners and minerals traders, as well as participant observations in remote mining areas far from national capitals.

Like Canada, many countries in Africa are richly endowed with mineral resources. Unlike Canada, however, many of these countries lack the capacity to implement good governance practices in their mineral resource sectors.

On the world stage, Canada is a powerful actor when it comes to the mineral sector. Canadian mining companies are among the largest in the world. Significant numbers of Canadian engineers and managers populate mining companies of all sizes operating in all corners of the globe. Canadian scientists and engineers are at the forefront of innovation in mining technologies, rechargeable batteries and various clean energy technologies. For more than two decades, Canada has been a leader of global initiatives to improve human security in mineral sectors, such as the Kimberley process on conflict diamonds and the voluntary principles on security and human rights.

As other witnesses underscored in their testimony to the committee, Canada has a long legacy of co-operation with Africa, though uneven in terms of length of commitment. The establishment of a dedicated mission and permanent observer to the African Union is the latest example of the promise of this co-operation.

Canada can leverage its prominence as a mining power to further strengthen and advance its economic co-operation with Africa via diplomatic efforts that support increased trade and investment with African partners in Africa's mineral sectors. For African countries, partnering with Canada is attractive because of its reputation as an honest broker and follower of rules-based trade and investment, support for human security and the rule of law, and the promotion of sustainable development, all of which aim to further African countries' economic development goals.

There are many reasons for close economic co-operation between Canada and Africa in the context of the continent's mineral resource sector. I will focus on one of these reasons: the geopolitical imperative of critical mineral supply chains brought on by the just energy transition in response to the rapid acceleration of climate change.

Critical minerals and controlling their supply chains represent the new frontier of geopolitics, something that China recognized with foresight some three decades ago. These much-sought-after mineral resources are vital to the manufacturing of aerospace, defence, magnet, electronic and clean energy components.

Canada's closest allies and trade partners—the United States, the United Kingdom, members of the European Union, Japan and Australia—have all realized that it is in their national interests to avoid critical mineral dependence on a singular country that is also a chief competitor on the world stage, whether the supply chain is upstream, such as with raw or processed minerals, or downstream, such as with manufactured goods like EVs and military and defence technology.

Friendshoring should also inform Canada's approach to critical mineral supply chains. Canada and many African countries are home to significant reserves of critical minerals and could therefore greatly benefit from the mining and processing of such minerals. To actualize these benefits, however, they need to strengthen the quality of supply chain governance and acquire insights into how to navigate the contours of a complex geopolitical environment that includes dependence on a singular country.

Canada can use its position as a mining power to promote best practices for inclusive, transparent and environmentally responsible critical mineral supply chains within African Union member states, thereby offering an attractive alternative to China's influence across the continent. Increasing the number of Canadian trade commissions across Africa is an important component of promoting these best practices and establishing strong partnerships with African countries and African entrepreneurs.

Thank you once again, Chair. I will be happy to elaborate on any of these points during our session today.