Thank you.
We at the Port of Halifax recognize the importance of this issue and sympathize with the thousands of Canadians who have been impacted by these criminal acts. We join Canadians in our concern over the growing problem of auto theft, which has become a very sophisticated crime. Those involved are highly organized. We are committed to working with the government and other supply chain stakeholders to address this issue and broader concerns surrounding the illicit movement of goods and/or people.
Canadian port authorities are delegated with specific and limited responsibilities for port security. Therefore, ports must work closely with their partners, including local police, federal enforcement authorities and the Canada Border Services Agency to achieve security.
When it comes to illicit activity, which also includes illegal drugs and human trafficking, there is no single solution to this problem. There are many groups, and they each have a role to play in terms of enforcement and prevention. Developing a strategy that will involve all groups working together is necessary.
For many years now, I have worked closely with the International Maritime Organization, or IMO. I can tell you that port security has been on their radar for a long time. At the start of the century, ports used to be open environments, but 9/11 changed all that. The IMO developed measures designed to combat terrorism—not specifically contraband—and continued to focus on security in a holistic way. The international ship and port facility security code was adopted in 2004. Following that, the IMO continued its work on maritime security. The IMO code of practice on security in ports offers a valuable framework for developing and implementing security strategies and identifying potential risks. There is a call at IMO to broaden the scope of the ISPS code to consider organized crime. I would recommend that the Canadian representatives on IMO engage with and support this initiative.
As it relates to security and containers, I want to talk a little bit about the process of packing and moving containers through a terminal. In general around the world, and also in Canada, there is no X-ray or scanning of export boxes unless the country of destination has a security requirement for a preload scan. This is because most border controls are focused on the import of illicit materials and not the export.
Typically, a shipping container is packed at an off-site location. The paperwork is done. That includes a self-declaration of what's inside. The container is closed and marked with a customs seal. When a container arrives at a terminal by either truck or rail, the container number is matched to the booking number, the customs seal is physically checked to see that it hasn't been broken, the serial number of the seal is noted against the container and then the container is put in the stacking area for export. Neither the terminal operator nor the port authority have the right to hold or open a container unless directed by the shipper, the shipping line or the CBSA.
In terms of documentation, there is a bill of lading, which is a legal contract between the shipper and the carrier that shows ownership, and there is a cargo manifest, which lists the contents of what is claimed to be inside the box. On the manifest document, you will find words like “said to contain”, because the only one who knows for sure what is in the container is the one who packed it.
If we consider the effectiveness of scanning export boxes, if the manifest says the box contains household goods but a scan reveals a car inside, then it's reasonable that enforcement agencies know they should be inspecting the container. But if they scan a box that has a car inside, and the manifest says there is a car inside, there is no way of knowing if that car is stolen without opening the container and looking to see if the VIN matches the ownership documents. Even that check might not catch a VIN that has been tampered with.
The point is that spending a lot of money on scanners may not fix the problem, and scanning every single container may not fix the problem. What we do know is that scanning containers takes time, resources and trained people. It's simply not realistic to scan every single export container or even the majority of them.
The other gap is the port security clearance. In many other jurisdictions, security credentialling is a requirement for anyone who must access a secure area more than once in a calendar year. That's not the case in Canada. Currently, there is no consistency in maritime transport security clearance cards between different ports. Every port creates its own card. The inconsistencies make the system vulnerable to fraud. Other jurisdictions have centralized systems with standardized cards, which make it easier to detect forgery and compare a card against a centralized database.
The federal budget proposes funding for Transport Canada and the RCMP to administer a centralized transportation security clearance program, which is a positive step.
We are respectful of the fact that people are concerned about auto theft and the threat of violence in communities affected by this problem. We need a broad solution that is realistic about the level of control required to effect positive change. Relying on port security as the last line of defence may not be as effective when considering such well-organized criminals. We need to consider a more integrated approach to port security that includes all levels of government, and considers the export of drugs and other illicit goods and people.
Thank you.
